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The last thing we may want to do is read Boston [Marathon
bombing] suspect Miranda Rights telling him to ‘remain
silent.’ . . . If captured, I hope [the] Administration will at least
consider holding the Boston suspect as enemy combatant for
intelligence gathering purposes.1
[The Boston Marathon Bombing] is Exhibit A of why the homeland
is the battlefield.2

INTRODUCTION
The Boston Marathon bombing, along with the prior “shoe”3
“underwear”4 and “Times Square”5 bombers, has prompted debate6
1. Lindsey
Graham,
@GrahamBlog,
TWITTER, http://www.twitter.com/
GrahamBlog (Apr. 19, 2013 at 4:40 PM and 4:33 PM), cited in Aaron Blake, Lindsay
Graham: Boston Bomber Could Be Held as Enemy Combatant, WASH. POST
POLITICS BLOG (Apr. 19, 2013, 5:49 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpolitics/wp/2013/04/19/lindsey-graham-boston-bomber-could-be-held-as-enemycombatant.
2. Jennifer Rubin, Sen. Lindsey Graham: Boston Bombing “Is Exhibit A of Why
the Homeland Is the Battlefield”, WASH. POST RIGHT TURN BLOG (Apr. 19, 2013,
4:44
PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2013/04/19/senlindsey-graham-boston-bombing-is-exhibit-a-of-why-the-homeland-is-the-battlefield/
(quoting Telephone Interview by Jennifer Rubin with Lindsey Graham, Sen., S.C.
(Apr. 19, 2013)).
3. United States v. Reid, 211 F. Supp. 2d 366, 366 (D. Mass. 2002).
4. United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 10-20005, 2011 WL 4345243, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 16, 2011) (denying the motion of the accused to suppress statements he
made to law enforcement officials while at the University of Michigan hospital, and
finding that the questioning of the accused by law enforcement before the recitation
of Miranda rights fell within the public safety exception).
5. See Complaint, United States v. Shahzad, No. 10CR00928, 2010 WL 1759461
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
6. See David Ashenfelter & Tresa Baldas, Judge’s Ruling on Miranda Rights in
Underwear Bomber Terrorism Case Touches Off Legal Debate, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.freep.com/article/20110916/NEWS06/109160374/
Judge-s-ruling-Miranda-rights-underwear-bomber-terrorism-case-touches-off-legaldebate; Richard Brust, Probing Questions: Experts Debate the Need to Create
Exceptions to Rules on Coerced Confessions, A.B.A. J. (June 1, 2012),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/probing_questions_experts_debate_the_
need_to_create_exceptions; Bernard Gwertzman, Shahzad Arrest Ignites Liberties
Debate, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 7, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-andthe-law/shahzad-arrest-ignites-liberties-debate/p22073; Charlie Savage, Debate Over
Delaying Miranda Warning, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20. 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/04/21/us/a-debate-over-delaying-suspects-miranda-rights.html?_r=0.
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on the applicability of traditional criminal procedure principles to
counterterrorism investigations and prosecutions. Much of the
discussion focuses on the efficacy and even appropriateness of
applying the public safety exception to the Miranda rights warning
requirement. What is missing is underscored by Senator Graham’s
comments—the possibility of indefinite detention and trial by military
commission fundamentally alters the implicit balance within the
public safety exception.
In New York v. Quarles, the Supreme Court created what has
come to be known as the Public Safety Exception (PSE) to the
Miranda warning and waiver requirement: when a police questions a
suspect in custody in response to an imminent threat of danger to the
officer or the public, the confession will be admissible even if the
officer failed to provide Miranda warnings and obtained a waiver.7 In
her opinion in Quarles, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
Justice O’Connor reminds us that Miranda does not prohibit public
safety questioning; Miranda simply restricts using the statement as
evidence.8 In essence, Miranda requires the government to make a
choice—question a suspect without first advising them of the Miranda
rights and obtaining a waiver of those rights in order to protect the
public, or advise the subject and seek a waiver to protect a future
prosecution. This Article challenges whether that choice remains
valid.
Implicit in that formulation is that failing to advise a suspect
questioned in a custodial setting of their Miranda rights may result in
the government foregoing the opportunity to incapacitate the
individual.9 This Article posits that the alternative “remedies” of
indefinite detention and trial by military commission fundamentally
alter the equation Justice O’Connor laid out in Quarles. This
alternative option for incapacitating a suspected terrorist operative
may, in certain situations (potentially even involving a U.S. citizen),
eliminate the binary “warn and risk imminent danger, or don’t warn
and risk the ability to prosecute” choice equation that was central to
the Quarles decision.

7. 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984).
8. Id. at 664 (“Miranda has never been read to prohibit the police from asking
questions to secure the public safety . . . . When police ask custodial questions
without administering the required warnings, Miranda quite clearly requires that the
answers received be presumed compelled and that they be excluded from evidence at
trial.”).
9. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
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Instead, the burden of risk associated with counter-terrorism
questioning has substantially shifted to the terrorism suspect. Unlike
the response options available to government law enforcement and
prosecution agents prior to September 11, 2001, the government does
not necessarily risk the ability to successfully prosecute (due to
inadmissibility of the confession)—and thereby incapacitate—the
terrorist suspect if a violation of Miranda results in inadmissibility of
the suspect’s confession. Rather, the government may now both
question in violation of the Miranda warning and waiver requirement
and then incapacitate the suspect through indefinite detention and/or
alternatively prosecute via a legislatively created military commission
employing perpetually evolving, and less rigorous procedures, than an
Article III court.10
This Article argues that expanding the scope of the PSE to allow
for more extensive interrogation of terrorism suspects will inure to
the suspects’ benefit. It will arguably incentivize the normal law
enforcement disposition for suspected terrorist suspects, and thereby
mitigate the likelihood that such suspects will be subjected to military
administrative detention. This in turn will enhance the probability of
finding resolution in an Article III court, rather than of subjecting the
suspects to indefinite detention or trial by a military commission.
Part I juxtaposes the well-established Miranda holding against the
dilemma of interrogating terrorism suspects. Part II then discusses
Quarles and explains how public safety does not always equate to
protecting the public. Part III explores indefinite detention and
military commission alternatives to traditional prosecution in an
Article III court. Part IV then explains how those alternatives
undermine the Quarles equation. Part V reconciles expanding the
Quarles PSE with Miranda, focusing on the risk of police calculation
and then by analogizing. Part V then draws support for an expanded
PSE by analogizing it with the special needs exceptions to the warrant
and probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
illustrating how an objective critique of the primary purpose of police
questioning can effectively regulate the applicability of an expanded
PSE. Part VI then outlines the contours of the proposed expansion of
the PSE. Part VII concludes by detailing how such an expansion
would incentivize the Article III court prosecution option and
constitute a net gain for terror suspects.
By focusing on actual voluntariness, an expanded PSE would be
consistent with the trend in the Supreme Court’s Miranda

10. See infra Part III.
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jurisprudence so long as the statement is actually voluntary.
Ultimately, the price of denying the government critical counterterrorism information and the risk of subjecting the suspect to
unwarned questioning with subsequent preventive, indefinite,
detention (because the statement is inadmissible) is not worth the
benefit of compliance with a mere prophylactic rule, so long as the
court validates that the statement was in fact voluntary.
I. MIRANDA, PUBLIC SAFETY, AND THE TERRORISM
INTERROGATION DILEMMA
Few Supreme Court decisions in our nation’s history have
generated more controversy than Miranda v. Arizona.11 In Miranda,
the Supreme Court concluded that the then-existing due process
“totality of the circumstances” test for assessing when a confession
was actually coerced was insufficient to protect individuals from the
inherently coercive environment of custodial interrogation.12 The
Court then concluded that this necessitated the imposition of a rights
warning requirement to offset this inherent coercion.13 Furthermore,
whenever an individual was subjected to custodial interrogation, the
government would bear the “heavy burden” of proving a knowing
and voluntary waiver of these noticed rights.14 This combined
warning and waiver requirement would establish that the suspect’s
statement was not the product of this inherent coercion, thereby
restoring confidence that the statement or confession was the product
of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege against compelled selfincrimination.15 Accordingly, a suspect’s statements, both inculpatory
and exculpatory,16 obtained during custodial interrogation would be

11. 384 U.S. 436; see, e.g., James Oliphant & David S. Savage, Controversy Over
Miranda Warnings for Terrorism Suspect, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/May/05/nation/la-na-ny-bomb-legalities-20100506.
12. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
13. Id. at 467–68.
14. Id. at 475.
15. Id. at 471–72.
16. Id. at 476–77. The Court explained:
The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our
opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent,
prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant. No
distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions
and statements which amount to ‘admissions’ of part or all of an offense.
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being
compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish
degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely the same reason, no
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admissible only when the government established a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the required Miranda rights.17 Furthermore,
effective waiver required police to prove that they informed the
suspect of a series of rights articulated by the Court, rights that are
today a ubiquitous aspect of American culture.18 According to the
decision,
To summarize, we hold that, when an individual is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in
any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege
against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards
must be employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully
effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of
silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be
scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He
must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that, if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise
these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded
him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these
rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But
unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the
prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation
can be used against him.19

Miranda therefore established a presumption-based rule of
admissibility: statements made absent a valid waiver are presumed
involuntary and therefore inadmissible; statements made following
waiver, however, are presumed voluntary and are admissible.20
Nevertheless, only one of these presumptions was conclusive: the
presumption of involuntariness.21 The Miranda opinion provided for
no exception to the exclusion of statements obtained absent valid
waiver.22 In contrast, statements preceded by such a waiver, while
distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements
alleged to be merely “exculpatory.”

Id.
17. Id. at 444; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000).
18. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443 (“Miranda has become embedded in routine police
practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.”).
19. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79.
20. Id. at 458.
21. See id. at 478–79.
22. See id. at 479.
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presumptively voluntary, might still be excluded if actually coerced in
violation of due process.23
From inception, the conclusive involuntariness presumption and
accordant exclusion triggered by a Miranda violation generated
criticism. Contrary to initial dire predictions, however, the ruling
never produced a debilitating effect on law enforcement.24 Indeed,
Miranda evolved to provide a net gain to law enforcement: police
practices became more professional; extremely high waiver rates (in
the range of eighty to ninety percent)25 meant police continued to
elicit confessions; the presumption of voluntariness resulting from
waiver, while not conclusive, made due process challenges infrequent
and almost impossible to sustain.26
In 2000, the Supreme Court accepted the case of Dickerson v.
United States.27 In Dickerson, the Fourth Circuit held that Congress
had properly superseded Miranda with a statute establishing a totality
of the circumstances voluntariness test as the touchstone for
confession admissibility.28 Dickerson teed up the opportunity to
overrule Miranda, a rule the Court had previously held swept more
broadly then the privilege against self-incrimination itself.29 In an
opinion written by the Chief Justice, a seven-justice majority declined
this opportunity, upholding the core Miranda rule.30 The Court
emphasized that Miranda had not produced the debilitating impact on
law enforcement originally predicted, and as a result there was no
23. Id.
24. Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (warning that the decision would “entail[]
harmful consequences for the country at large”).
25. Anthony J. Domanico et al., Overcoming Miranda: A Content Analysis of the
Miranda Portion of Police Interrogations, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2012) (an analysis of
the Miranda portion of a sample of electronically recorded interrogations revealed
that more than ninety percent of suspects waived their Miranda rights and spoke with
police); Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of
Contemporary Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 792 (2006)
(“[M]odern studies demonstrate that roughly eighty percent of suspects waive their
Miranda rights and talk to the police.” (citation omitted)).
26. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443–44. The Court explained:
[O]ur subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on
legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s core ruling that
unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution’s case
in chief . . . . [C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument
that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the
law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.

Id.
27.
28.
29.
30.

530 U.S. 428, 431–32 (2000).

See id. at 431–32.
See Oregon v. Elstadt, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985).
See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
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compelling reason to deviate from stare decisis and overturn the
decision.31
Dickerson attributed the Court’s adjustments to the original
Miranda rule in a series of post-Miranda decisions to the fact that no
rule, even a constitutional rule, is immutable. The Court also
suggested that these adjustments to the scope of the original Miranda
rule supported the conclusion that the tailored rule that emerged
from these prior decisions served a legitimate constitutional purpose
without a serious cost of over-breadth.32
The first of these adjustments was the Court’s endorsement of what
came to be known as the public safety exception to Miranda. In New
York v. Quarles, the Court held that statements made in response to
police questions motivated by a primary public or police safety
interest, even if made while in custody, do not implicate the concerns
that resulted in the Miranda decision.33 Accordingly, these statements
are admissible even without complying with Miranda’s warning and
waiver requirement.34
As will be explained in more detail below, the precise scope of the
Quarles PSE has never been totally clear. Was it sine qua non
spontaneity in the face of an imminent threat? Or was it a primary
objective of defusing that imminent threat?
When the FBI
questioned Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on December 25, 2009
based on his apparent effort to ignite a bomb he concealed in his
underwear during a transatlantic airline flight, this uncertainty came
into sharp focus.35 FBI agents conducted this questioning at the
hospital where Abdulmutallab was being treated for burns resulting
from his failed attempt.36 The agents had been informed by Customs
and Border Patrol agents of the attempt and that Abdulmutallab had
been taken into custody at the airport. The questioning obviously
occurred some time after the arrest, and lasted for approximately fifty
minutes.37
According to the district court’s ruling denying
Abdulmutallab’s motion to suppress his statements:
[Defendant was asked] where he traveled, when he had traveled,
how, and with whom; the details of the explosive device; the details

31. Id. at 443–44.
32. See id. at 442.
33. 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984).
34. See id. at 657–58.
35. United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 10-20005, 2011 WL 4345243, at *2–4
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2011).
36. Id. at *1.
37. Id. at *1.
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regarding the bomb-maker, including where Defendant had received
the bomb; his intentions in attacking Flight 253; who else might be
planning an attack; whether he associated with, lived with, or
attended the same mosque with others who had a similar mind-set as
Defendant about jihad, martyrdom, support for al-Qaeda, and a
desire to attack the United States by using a similar explosive device
on a plane, and what these individuals looked like—all in an attempt
to discover whether Defendant had information about others who
could be on planes or about to board planes with explosive devices
similar to the one Defendant used because, based upon his training,
experience, and knowledge of earlier al-Qaeda attacks, this was not
a solo incident and the potential for a multi-prong attack existed
even if Defendant was unaware of any specific additional planned
attack.38

The trial court denied Abdulmutallab’s motion, concluding that
this questioning fell within the Quarles public safety exception.39
Before his motion was even filed, however, the issue of applying the
public safety exception to the questioning of suspected terrorists
triggered a significant debate.40 This debate was sparked not only by
news reports of Abdulmutallab’s questioning without a Miranda
warning or waiver, but also by Attorney General Eric Holder’s
statement that the government might ask Congress to provide
statutory authority for such unwarned questioning in future situations
in order to bolster the government’s legal posture.41 Holder asserted
in numerous forums, including in his testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, that the public safety exception should be
clarified to provide federal agents with necessary flexibility to permit
unwarned questioning of terror suspects for sufficient duration to
achieve their primary preventive purpose.42

38. Id. at *5
39. Id. at *6 (“The circumstances present at the time of Defendant’s questioning
fall within the public safety exception to Miranda recognized in Quarles.”).
40. See Terry Frieden, Holder: Handling of Would-Be Bomber Consistent with
Past Policy, CNN (Feb. 3, 2010, 5:21 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/
02/03/holder.terror.charges/index.html.
41. See Anne E. Kornblut, Obama Administration Looks Into Modifying
Miranda Law in the Age of Terrorism, WASH. POST, May 10, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/09/AR2010050902062.html.
42. See Oversight of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Hearing Before the Committee on
the Judiciary United States Senate, 111 Cong. (2010) (questioning of Eric Holder,
Att’y Gen. of the United States); see also Kornblut, supra note 41; Hanna F. Madbak,
Attorney General Holder to Engage Congress to Legislate on Miranda, N.Y. ST. B.
ASS’N (May 31, 2010, 10:46 AM), http://nysbar.com/blogs/ExecutiveDetention/
2010/05/attorney_general_holder_to_eng_1.html.
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The debate triggered by this proposal has focused almost
exclusively on the scope of the original Quarles exception and the
efficacy of the exception when restrictively interpreted.43 Opponents
to an expanded temporal scope argue that the threat of terrorism
cannot be permitted to dilute core constitutional protections.44 In an
era where terrorism is viewed as a threat to both the safety of the
country and the liberties established by our Constitution, this is
unsurprising. What is absent from this debate, however, is an
assessment of the options available to the government when
confronting terrorist suspects taken into custody, and how those
options impact an assessment of the relative merits of an expanded
public safety exception.
Abdulmutallab’s case is instructive. When taken into custody in
Detroit,45 government officials did not possess just one criminal law
enforcement response option. Instead, like any other individual
suspected of being a member of or associated with al-Qaeda, the
government had two distinct response options to choose from in
order to incapacitate Abdulmutallab. The first option was federal
criminal process. This is the option the government obviously
selected—an option that ultimately proved effective.46 However, by
questioning Abdulmutallab without first obtaining a Miranda waiver,
the government assumed risk that his statements would be
inadmissible. This appears to have been a calculated risk, because
unlike the facts of Quarles, there was nothing spontaneous about the
questioning.47 Thus, when FBI agents conducted that questioning,
they confronted the traditional risk continuum resulting from the
Quarles decision: either the statements would fall within the public
safety exception and be admissible, or they would not and could not
be used in the government’s case in chief. The latter outcome might
not prevent Abdulmutallab’s prosecution, but it would certainly make
it more difficult.

43. See Joanna Wright, Note, Mirandizing Terrorists? An Empirical Analysis of
the Public Safety Exception, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1296 (2011).
44. See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Creating an Exception to an Exception—Too
Dangerous and Too Unwarranted, JURIST (Apr. 2, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/
2011/04/creating-an-exception-to-an-exception.php. See generally Rorie A. Norton,
Note, Matters of Public Safety and the Current Quarrel Over the Scope of the
Quarles Exception to Miranda, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 (2010).
45. United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 10-20005, 2011 WL 4345243, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 16, 2011).
46. See id. at *6
47. See id.
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Because of the advent of terrorist “enemy belligerent detention”
associated with the U.S. military response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the government had an alternate option to
incapacitate Abdulmutallab: designate him an unprivileged enemy
belligerent (UEB) and transfer him to the detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for long-term preventive detention, and
perhaps trial by military commission.48 Although not invoked, a
number of prominent lawmakers were demanding just such a course
of action immediately following Abdulmutallab’s arrest.49
Had the government invoked this option, concerns over Miranda
would have been immediately nullified. Indeed, confessing to being
affiliated with al-Qaeda and engaging in activity intended to cause
death or destruction to U.S. persons or property would have
facilitated the UEB designation.
Furthermore, treating
Abdulmutallab as an UEB would have allowed the government to
conduct a long interrogation with no concern for Miranda
compliance. Instead, the only consideration would have been
protecting any statements from an assertion that they were coerced,
and even then this would only be relevant in the event that the
government chose to go beyond preventive detention and pursue
criminal prosecution before a military commission.
This alternate option reveals that critics of extending the Quarles
PSE to cases such as Abdulmutallab’s may not have fully
contemplated the second order effects of a more restrictive
application. It is unlikely that civil libertarians would consider the
military detention and trial option preferable to trial in an Article III
federal court. Accordingly, the broadened scope of the public safety
exception applied in Abdulmutallab’s case, and advocated by the
Attorney General, is actually an important protection for suspected
terror operatives, for it will make the military incapacitation option
less likely. This is not to suggest that permitting questioning pursuant
to the exception will guarantee the civilian criminal option. Indeed,
there may be cases where the statements obtained during the
questioning will result in a decision to invoke the military option. But
it does seem clear that a narrowly construed application of Quarles
will always incentivize invoking the military option from the outset of

48. See 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7) (2012).
49. See generally Letter from Joseph I. Lieberman, Homeland Sec’y &
Governmental Affairs Comm. Chairman, to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. of the United
States (Jan. 25, 2010), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majoritymedia/lieberman-collins-urge-administration-to-move-abdulmutallab-into-militarycustody.
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the investigatory response. Such an outcome is at odds with an
effective balance between security and liberty that is at the core of
both Quarles, and the broader government effort to respond to the
threat of transnational terrorism.
II. MIRANDA AND QUARLES: WHY PUBLIC SAFETY DOES NOT
ALWAYS MEAN PROTECTING THE PUBLIC
Prior to its decision in Quarles, the Supreme Court had already
ruled that statements made in violation of Miranda could be used for
impeachment purposes.50 This decision was based on the Court’s
conclusion that Miranda had not been intended to arm a defendant
with the ability to present false testimony.51 In Quarles, however, the
Court confronted the question of whether all statements made in
violation of Miranda were inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in
chief, a question that seemed foreclosed by Miranda itself.52
Quarles involved a spontaneous police questioning in response to
the realization that the suspect of a violent sexual assault just taken
into custody had discarded his pistol in a small bodega.53 After a
woman approached two patrol officers and told them she had just
been raped by a man who went into a supermarket, one officer called
for assistance while the other, Officer Kraft, went to the supermarket
to search for the suspect.54 Kraft spotted a man matching the
description of the assailant as soon as he entered the store.55 The
suspect, Benjamin Quarles, ran from Kraft towards the back of the
market.56 Kraft lost sight of Quarles, but then saw him again and
ordered him to stop.57 Quarles complied, and while frisking Quarles,
Kraft realized Quarles was wearing an empty pistol holster.58 Kraft
immediately cuffed Quarles, and then asked him where the gun was.59
Quarles nodded towards some boxes in the supermarket and said,
“the gun is over there.”60 Kraft then read Quarles Miranda warnings,

50. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 452 (2000) (“A defendant’s
statement taken in violation of Miranda that was nonetheless voluntary could be used
at trial for impeachment purposes.” (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975))).
51. See id.
52. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657–58 (1984).
53. Id. at 651–52.
54. Id. at 652.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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obtained a waiver, and asked Quarles additional questions.61 Quarles
admitted the pistol was his.62
Quarles moved to suppress both statements and the pistol prior to
his trial.63 Quarles asserted that Miranda dictated exclusion of the
first statement, and that the pistol and second statement were fruit of
the unwarned first statement64 (a theory subsequently rejected by the
Court in Oregon v. Elstad).65 The trial court’s decision to grant the
Motion to Suppress was upheld by the intermediate appellate court
and by the New York Court of Appeals.66 These courts both rejected
the Government’s argument that public safety justified excusing the
normal Miranda requirements.67
Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed, and created the public
safety exception to the Miranda warning and waiver requirement.68
Early in the opinion, the Court noted that “the Miranda Court,
however, presumed that interrogation in certain custodial
circumstances is inherently coercive and held that statements made
under those circumstances are inadmissible unless the suspect is
specifically informed of his Miranda rights and freely decides to forgo
those rights.”69 The use of the “certain circumstances” qualifier set up
the rationale for the exception the Court created.70 The Court then
emphasized Miranda’s original motivation: to protect suspects from
the inherent coercion associated with custodial interrogation.71 The
Court focused on Miranda’s extensive discussion of police ‘station
house’ interrogation tactics, and concluded that when an officer like
Kraft confronts an imminent danger to the public or other police
officers—like the danger associated with a missing firearm in a
location where confederates may be laying in wait for the police72—

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 652–653.
64. Id.
65. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
66. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 652–53.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 654 (second emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 656.
72. Id. at 657. (“The police in this case, in the very act of apprehending a suspect,
were confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a
gun which they had every reason to believe the suspect had just removed from his
empty holster and discarded in the supermarket. So long as the gun was concealed
somewhere in the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously
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they will not have the opportunity to calculate tactics to coerce the
suspect into confessing.73 Accordingly, questioning a custodial
suspect in a situation like the type Kraft confronted is not a
“circumstance” involving the type of inherent coercion necessary to
trigger Miranda’s concern, and therefore compliance with Miranda is
not a necessary predicate to admissibility.74 According to the Court,
“[w]hatever the motivation of individual officers in such a situation,
we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings
of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in
which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern
for the public safety.”75
Public safety, however, was not the exclusive ratio decidendi of the
opinion. In addition to the public safety motivation, the Court
emphasized the questioning’s spontaneity, and how that spontaneity
mitigated the risks associated with traditional custodial interrogation
so central to the Miranda decision:
In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these
officers, where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual
is necessarily the order of the day, the application of the exception
which we recognize today should not be made to depend on post hoc
findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective
motivation of the arresting officer.76

The Court bolstered this spontaneity factor by also emphasizing
the immediacy of the officer’s decision-making process, and the
imminence of the threat confronted by the officer:

posed more than one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it,
a customer or employee might later come upon it.”).
73. See id. at 656 (“In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these
officers, where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily
the order of the day, the application of the exception which we recognize today
should not be made to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing
concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting officer.”).
74. See id. at 657–58 (“We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a
situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic
rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination. We
decline to place officers such as Officer Kraft in the untenable position of having to
consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask
the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and render whatever
probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the warnings in
order to preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but possibly
damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile
situation confronting them.”).
75. Id. at 656.
76. Id.
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We decline to place officers such as Officer Kraft in the untenable
position of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether
it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without
the Miranda warnings and render whatever probative evidence they
uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the warnings in order to
preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but
possibly damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and
neutralize the volatile situation confronting them.77

Quarles’s ultimate holding did not impose a strict spontaneity
requirement. Instead, the Court opened the door to a balancing of
interests that might justify invoking the exception in situations far less
spontaneous than the one Kraft confronted:
Procedural safeguards which deter a suspect from responding were
deemed acceptable in Miranda in order to protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege; when the primary social cost of those added
protections is the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda
majority was willing to bear that cost. Here, had Miranda warnings
deterred Quarles from responding to Officer Kraft’s question about
the whereabouts of the gun, the cost would have been something
more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in convicting
Quarles. Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not simply
to make his case against Quarles but to insure that further danger to
the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public
area.
We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a situation
posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the
prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
against self-incrimination.78

Subsequent application of the PSE presents a mixed bag of
emphasis on both the imminent threat and the spontaneity aspect of
Quarles. It seems clear that by opening the door to a safety oriented
balance of relative interests to justify invoking the exception, the
Court set the conditions for its ultimate application to the suspected
terrorist context.
III. THE INDEFINITE D ETENTION/MILITARY COMMISSION
ALTERNATIVE
Confusion continues to surround, and cloud, U.S. counterterrorism
detention policy and practice. The confusion flows from multiple
sources, including the difficulty in defining battlefield and

77. Id. at 657–58 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 657.
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belligerents, but also inconsistent and often poorly explained U.S.
counterterrorism policy. Yet it is the nature and purpose of detention
in armed conflict coupled with that policy and practice that results in
the specter of indefinite detention and implicit nullification of
Quarles.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in considering the detention of a U.S.
citizen during hostilities in Afghanistan, held that “[t]he capture and
detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial
of unlawful combatants, by ‘universal agreement and practice,’ are
‘important incident[s] of war.’ The purpose of detention is to prevent
captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking
up arms once again.”79
Capturing or detaining a member of an enemy force is based on
their status as such, not on an individualized assessment of their
threat. The law of armed conflict presumes that members of an
enemy force “are part of the military potential of the enemy and it is
therefore always lawful to attack [and thus to capture] them for the
purpose of weakening that potential.”80
As the International
Committee of the Red Cross acknowledges, “Prisoners of war may be
interned . . . for no individual reason. The purpose of this internment
is not to punish them, but only to hinder their direct participation in
hostilities and/or to protect them.”81
Because this detention incapacitates individuals to prevent their
return to hostilities, the detention period lasts until the cessation of
those hostilities.82 Unlike the clearly defined end of hostilities with
Italy, Germany, and Japan during World War II, it is unclear when
and if the cessation of hostilities between the United States and alQaeda would occur. Therein lie the seeds for the current indefinite

79. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (citation omitted). Similarly,
during World War II the Court stated that “[l]awful combatants are subject to
capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful
combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are
subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their
belligerency unlawful.” Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942).
80. Marco Sassóli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between International

Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where it Matters: Admissible Killing and
Internment of Fighters in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 90 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 599, 606 (2008).
81. 1 MARCO SASSÓLI ET AL., HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? CASES,
DOCUMENTS AND TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, chs. 6, 10 (3d ed. 2011), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-0739-part-i.pdf.
82. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

2013]

STRANGE BEDFELLOWS

17

detention regimes in Guantanamo and Afghanistan.83 Today, this
indefinite detention regime is supported by statute, originally the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”),84 and later
through a National Defense Authorization Act.85
A. Authorization for Use of Military Force.
On September 14, 2001, the U.S. Congress passed the AUMF,
which the President signed into law on September 18, 2001.86 The
AUMF states:
(a) IN GENERAL—That the President is authorized to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations or persons.87

It was this language and its implications on detention that the
Supreme Court addressed in Hamdi.88 The Court found that where
Congress has permitted the use of necessary and appropriate force,

83. The U.S. military’s continued detention system in Afghanistan has been
overshadowed, understandably enough, by Guantanamo. Ostensibly, pursuant to an
agreement between the United States and Afghanistan, the United States has
transferred control of detention operations to the Government of Afghanistan. See
Memorandum of Understanding on Transfer of U.S. Detention Facilities in Afghan
Territory to Afghanistan, U.S.-Afg., Mar. 9, 2012, available at http://
http://www.mfa.gov.af/en/news/7671; US Military Gives Control of Its Last Detention
Center
to
Afghans,
FOX
NEWS
(Mar.
25,
2013),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/25/us-military-to-hand-over-detentionfacility-to-afghan-government/. But in what one commentator styled a “second
Guantanamo,” the United States is continuing to detain over sixty-five third-party
nationals, in other words, non-Afghans, in Afghanistan. Kevin Sieff, In Afghanistan,
a Second Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/in-afghanistan-a-second-guantanamo/2013/08/04/e33e8658-f53e-11e2-81fa8e83b3864c36_print.html. Sieff contends that the majority of the non-Afghan
detainees are Pakistani and that essentially Afghanistan is allowing the United States
to detain non-Afghans in exchange for having handed over the Afghan detainees. Id.
These non-Afghan detainees include individuals captured in Afghanistan and
Pakistan but also the Middle East, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Id.
84. See generally Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No.
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
85. See generally National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub.
L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011).
86. 115 Stat. 224 § 2; see Bill Summary & Status 107th Congress (2001–2002)
S.J.RES. 23 All Information, LIBRARY CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d107:SJ00023:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
87. 115 Stat. 224 § 2(a).
88. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 573 (2004).
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“Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the
narrow circumstances [of Hamdi].”89 Hamdi argued that the AUMF
did not authorize his indefinite detention.90 The Court interpreted
Hamdi’s objection “to be not to the lack of certainty regarding the
date on which the conflict [with al-Qaeda] will end, but to the
substantial prospect of perpetual detention.”91 In response, the Court
repeated the Government’s assertion that “the detention of enemy
combatants during World War II was just as ‘indefinite’ while that
war was being fought.”92
The Court then acknowledged the viability of Hamdi’s concern of
indefinite detention in a “war on terror,” stating:
We recognize that the national security underpinnings of the “war
on terror,” although crucially important, are broad and malleable.
As the Government concedes, “given its unconventional nature, the
current conflict is unlikely to end with a formal cease-fire
agreement.” The prospect Hamdi raises is therefore not far-fetched.
If the Government does not consider this unconventional war won
for two generations, and if it maintains during that time that Hamdi
might, if released, rejoin forces fighting against the United States,
then the position it has taken throughout the litigation of this case
suggests that Hamdi’s detention could last for the rest of his life.93

Ultimately the Court ruled that under the AUMF, “[t]he United
States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals
legitimately determined to be Taliban combatants who engaged in an
armed conflict against the United States.”94
89. Id. at 519.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 520.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 521. The Court’s analysis included referring to active and ongoing
hostilities between the United States and the Taliban and that some 13,500 U.S.
troops were deployed to Afghanistan. What then in 2014, when, according to
President Obama, the U.S. “war in Afghanistan will be over”? Barack Obama,
President of the United States, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-stateunion-address. With 13,500 troops in Afghanistan at the time of Hamdi, what if the
United States has 10,000 or 5000 troops in Afghanistan after 2014? And even if the
United States exercises what some are calling the “zero option”—removal of all U.S.
troops from Afghanistan—what of the U.S. Army’s claim that the United States is in
an era of “persistent conflict”? See Mark Mazetti & Matthew Rosenberg, U.S.
Considers Faster Pullout in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/world/asia/frustrated-obama-considers-full-troopwithdrawal-from-afghanistan.html?pagewanted=all (describing range of U.S.
withdrawal options from Afghanistan); see also Strategic Context, U.S. ARMY,
http://www.army.mil/aps/08/strategic_context/strategic_context.html (last visited Nov.
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But the use of force (and thus detention) under the AUMF is
limited to “those nations, organizations, or persons [the President]
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 . . . .”95 The AUMF’s
utility seemed to wane over time, following successful operations that
killed or captured much of al-Qaeda’s leadership, coupled with the
post-9/11 outgrowth of al-Qaeda cells and affiliated groups in
different parts of the world.96
What followed is additional legislation that authorizes (or
reaffirms) the U.S. government’s authority to indefinitely detain
and/or prosecute via military commission members of al-Qaeda and
associated forces who commit belligerent acts against the United
States.
B.

National Defense Authorization Act § 1021

To counter any gaps in the AUMF or perceptions of its diminishing
applicability, the U.S. Congress, as part of the 2012 National Defense
Authorization Act, passed section 1021, entitled “Affirmation of
Authority of the Armed Forces of the United States to Detain

10, 2013) (“We have looked at the future and expect a future of protracted
confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors who will use violence to
achieve political, religious, and other ideological ends.”).
95. Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
96. See Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Law of Armed Conflict, the Use of

Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 113th Cong. (2013) (describing various views on
the current utility of the AUMF); see also Joseph Straw, Most of Al Qaeda’s Big
Names Have Been Either Captured or Killed, But Some Remain, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
July
21,
2013,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/al-qaeda-decimatedobliterated-article-1.1405185. Notable al-Qaeda groups are located in Yemen,
Somalia, and a host of African countries. See JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., AL QAEDA AND AFFILIATES: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, GLOBAL PRESENCE,
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 14–15, 19–22, 23–25 (2011); The State of AlECONOMIST
(Sept.
28,
2013),
Qaeda:
The
Unquenchable
Fire,
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21586834-adaptable-and-resilient-al-qaedaand-its-allies-keep-bouncing-back-unquenchable-fire. Beginning with the U.S. war in
Iraq, al-Qaeda focused considerable efforts there, which have continued to this day.
See Ashish Kumar Se, Al Qaeda Drives Iraq Toward Chaos; U.S. Withdrawal Left
Door Open to Sectarian Battle for Power, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2013,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/8/al-qaeda-drives-iraq-towardchaos/#ixzz2d5ArhMBo. And al-Qaeda’s presence in the civil war in Syria continues
to grow. David Ignatius, Al-Qaeda Affiliate Playing Larger Role in Syria Rebellion,
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpartisan/post/al-qaeda-affiliate-playing-larger-role-in-syriarebellion/2012/11/30/203d06f4-3b2e-11e2-9258-ac7c78d5c680_blog.html.
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Covered Persons Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military
Force.”97 Under § 1021:
a) IN GENERAL.—Congress affirms that the authority of the
President to use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40; 50
U.S.C. 1541 note) includes the authority for the Armed Forces of
the United States to detain covered persons (as defined in
subsection (b)) pending disposition under the law of war.
(b) COVERED PERSONS.-A covered person under this section is
any person as follows:
(1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
those responsible for those attacks.
(2) A person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda,
the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners, including any
person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly
supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.
(c) DISPOSITION UNDER LAW OF WAR.-The disposition of a
person under the law of war as described in subsection (a) may
include the following:
(1) Detention under the law of war without trial until the end of the
hostilities authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military
Force.
(2) Trial under chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code (as
amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (title XVIII of
Public Law 111-84)).98

Section 1021 expands several aspects of the AUMF. Members of
al-Qaeda and the Taliban remain “covered persons,” and § 1021 adds
non-members who “substantially support” and forces associated with,
al-Qaeda and the Taliban.99 The definitions or parameters of
substantial support and associated forces remain unclear.
Section 1021 makes clear that detention of covered persons may be
without trial and last until the “end of the hostilities authorized by the
Authorization for Use of Military Force.”100 But as discussed
previously, the hostilities that the AUMF authorized were against

97. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 1021, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
98. Id.
99. Id. § 1021(b).
100. Id. § 1021(c)(1).
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those who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 9/11 attacks
or harbored them.101 While § 1021 gives the impression that there is a
temporal limitation on its detention provisions, the United States will
never capture or kill everyone associated with 9/11. Given that is how
long the § 1021 detention authority lasts, its provisions, absent repeal
or modification, should be treated as operative for decades to come.
And while the AUMF is retrospective in sense of the 9/11 attacks
which had already occurred, the stated purpose of the AUMF is “to

prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.”102 Such a purpose,
laudable that it is, is aspirational and seems completely, perpetually,
open-ended.
A collection of journalists challenged the constitutionality of §
1021, claiming that § (b)(2)’s reference to “substantial support” was
impermissibly vague and violated their First and Fifth Amendment
Rights.103 A federal district court agreed and issued a preliminary
injunction enjoining the U.S. government from enforcing § 1021.104
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the
injunction.105 The court held that § 1021 “says nothing about the
government’s ability to detain citizens,” thus disposing of the citizen
plaintiffs, and that the non-citizen plaintiff’s lacked standing.106
Ultimately, the court ruled:
With respect to individuals who are not citizens, are not lawful
resident aliens, and are not captured or arrested within the United
States, the President’s AUMF authority includes the authority to
detain those responsible for 9/11 as well as those who were a part of,
or substantially supported, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners—a detention authority that Section 1021
concludes was granted by the original AUMF. But with respect to

101. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a),
115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331 (KFB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68683, at
*34 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012). The plaintiffs’ concerns, at least in part, stemmed from
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project. Id. at *14–15. There, the Supreme Court ruled
that a criminal statute that prohibited providing material support to terrorist groups
was not void for vagueness. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705
(2010).
104. Hedges v. Obama, 890 F. Supp. 2d 424, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
105. Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 205 (2d Cir. 2013).
106. Id. at 204–05.
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citizens, lawful resident aliens, or individuals captured or arrested in
the United States, Section 1021 simply says nothing at all.107

The result is that at a minimum, there is a category of individuals
(non-citizens) who are not lawful resident aliens and not captured or
arrested within the United States for whom indefinite detention
and/or trial by military commission is possible. The court did not say
other categories (citizens, lawful resident aliens, those captured in the
United States) could not be indefinitely detained but that § 1021 is
silent.108
Because the government may now indefinitely incapacitate and/or
try at least certain terror crime suspects via military commission, the
Quarles balance has been fundamentally altered. The possibility of
indefinite detention and/or trial by military commission results in the
government no longer having to choose between public safety and
prosecution. Indeed, the government has essentially acknowledged as
much. As the former Attorney General explained:
The United States has every right to capture and detain enemy
combatants in this conflict, and need not simply release them to the
battlefield . . . . We have every right to prevent them from returning
to kill our troops or those fighting with us, and to target innocent
civilians. And this detention often yields valuable intelligence about
the intentions, organization, operations, and tactics of our enemy.
In short, detaining dangerous enemy combatants is lawful, and
makes our Nation safer.
....
[T]o suggest that the government must charge detainees with crimes
or release them is to seriously misunderstand the principal reasons
why we detain enemy combatants in the first place: it has to do with
self-protection, because these are dangerous people who pose
threats to our citizens and to our soldiers.109

107. Id. at 192.
108. Id. President Obama, in a signing statement, stated, “I want to clarify that my
Administration will not authorize the indefinite military detention without trial of
American citizens. Indeed, I believe that doing so would break with our most
important traditions and values as a Nation.” President Barack Obama, Statement on
H.R. 1540 (Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/31/
statement-president-hr-1540. The legal import of such statements remains unclear. At
most, President Obama is binding his administration with this statement by policy,
not law.
109. Michael Mukasey, Att’y Gen. of the United States, Remarks at the American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, (July 21, 2008),
http://www.aei.org/files/2008/07/21/20080721_DOJ.pdf.
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The former Attorney General was referring to “enemy
combatants” in his remarks.110 And while the terms enemy combatant
and indefinite detention evoke foreigners and far off battlefields to
some, as the article noted at the outset they have been hurled,
however incorrectly, at U.S. citizens and for actions taken in the
United States. The authority to indefinitely detain may lie dormant,
for a time, but its significance should not be overlooked.
If—and realistically when—the Taliban, al-Qaeda or associated
forces conduct another terrorist attack in the United States, and
particularly one causing substantial loss of life, there will already be a
statute which on its face allows for their indefinite detention. Future
attacks are inevitable—as is the pressure to invoke the alternative
incapacitation option, indefinite detention.
The existence of this indefinite detention option therefore
undermines the Quarles equation. Expanding the public safety
exception to apply to certain terrorist suspects is therefore necessary
to preserve the balance between the need to ensure an effective
response to an imminent public danger and protection of the criminal
suspect Quarles was intended to achieve.
IV. RECONCILING AN EXPANDED QUARLES E XCEPTION WITH

MIRANDA
Any proposed expansion of the Quarles PSE will inevitably be
scrutinized against the underlying purpose of Miranda itself. Indeed,
Justice O’Conner’s dissent in Quarles exposed the inherent
inconsistency between the Miranda ruling and the very notion of an
“exception” to that ruling.111 Thus, while the PSE is now a firmly
rooted exception to Miranda, it is the narrow nature of that exception
that arguably led the Quarles majority to reject O’Conner’s
argument. Each step of expansion, however, ostensibly exacerbates
the inconsistency highlighted by Justice O’Conner.
A. The Evolution of the Miranda Rule: Focusing on the Core
Concern of the Risk of Police Calculation
There has been an undeniable shift in the Court’s treatment of

Miranda since Quarles was decided, a shift that suggests a much more
significant tolerance for tailoring the impact of the Miranda rule to
the realities of investigatory necessities. Indeed, almost as soon as

Miranda was decided, the Supreme Court began to dilute the broad
110. Id.
111. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 670–72 (1984) (O’Connor, J. Dissenting).
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sweep of the warning and waiver requirement.
This was
accomplished through a chain of decisions interpreting the meaning
of key components of the Miranda decision, including the meaning of
custody,112 interrogation,113 voluntary waiver,114 and the consequence
of a violation itself.115
Ironically, in Oregon v. Elstadt, Justice O’Connor authored what
was perhaps the most profound manifestation of the Court’s
conclusion that Miranda, as originally conceived, was constitutionally
overbroad. 116 In Elstad, the Court concluded that the “[t]he Miranda
exclusionary rule . . . serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.”117 Accordingly, the Court
rejected the assertion that a Miranda violation constitutes a
“poisoned tree” for purposes of derivative fruits admissibility analysis
because a Miranda violation was not ipso facto a constitutional
violation, but instead merely the violation of a Court imposed
“prophylactic” intended to protect the core constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination.118

112. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (holding that Miranda
applies when a suspect has been taken into formal police custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action).
113. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (“[T]he term
‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.”). This standard is commonly referred to as
questioning or its “functional equivalent.” Id. at 300–01.
114. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373–75 (1979). An accused’s
express statement can constitute a valid waiver, although such a statement is not
required to find a waiver was voluntary. Id. at 373. In the absence of an express
statement, whether a voluntary waiver is given is to “be determined on the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience,
and conduct of the [defendant].” Id. at 374–75 (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985) (“When police ask questions of a
suspect in custody without administering the required warnings, Miranda dictates
that the answers received be presumed compelled and that they be excluded from
evidence at trial in the State’s case in chief.”).
116. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
117. Id. at 306.
118. See id. at 307–08 (“[T]he Miranda presumption, though irrebuttable for
purposes of the prosecution’s case in chief, does not require that the statements and
their fruits be discarded as inherently tainted.”). The Court elaborated by noting that
unwarned questioning did not abridge respondent’s constitutional
privilege . . . but departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid
down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege. Since there was
no actual infringement of the suspect’s constitutional rights, the case was not
controlled by the doctrine expressed in Wong Sun that fruits of a
constitutional violation must be suppressed.
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As a result of these decisions, the impact of Miranda on law
enforcement questioning is much narrower today than when the rule
was first imposed, and each of these cases reflects the willingness of
the Court to engage in pragmatic tailoring of the rule. It is true that
the Court did ultimately uphold Miranda when faced with a direct
challenge to the ruling in Dickerson.119 Even that decision, however,
expressly indicated that the continued vitality of Miranda is in large
part the result of the fact that it has been tailored to more effectively
balance the needs of law enforcement with the core protection it
sought to enhance. According to Justice Rehnquist, “our subsequent
cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law
enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s core ruling that
unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the
prosecution’s case in chief.”120 Accordingly, while the Dickerson
decision saved Miranda from ultimate demise, the nature of the
protection for criminal suspects it saved was far more restrictive than
that provided by the original Miranda decision.
Based on this tailoring trend, it is well within the realm of reason to
anticipate that the Court would be inclined to support an extension of
the PSE to address a genuine risk of imminent terrorist attack.
Questioning motivated by preventing such an attack would be within
the logical scope of the PSE. This motivation would ostensibly
mitigate the risk that police agents would utilize the strategies that led
the Miranda Court to impose the warning and waiver requirement to
ensure a voluntary relinquishment of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Such questioning would also serve a compelling public interest
distinct from merely discovering evidence for use against the suspect
at trial.
B.

Other Indicators of the Valid Influence of the Terrorism
Threat: The Special Needs Doctrine Analogy

This latter aspect of an expanded PSE—justifying an exception to
the normally applicable restriction on law enforcement activities
when the primary purpose of those activities is not to discover
evidence, but to protect the public from an imminent public danger—
finds support by analogy in the special needs exception to the warrant

Id. at 308 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court subsequently confirmed the
inapplicability of Wong Son poison fruit analysis to a Miranda violation. See United
States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643 (2004).
119. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
120. Id. at 443–44.
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and probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment.121 While
the special needs doctrine is limited to the Fourth Amendment and
has never been applied in the context of police questioning, the
underlying rationale of the doctrine does indicate a willingness of the
Court to allow a broader scope of investigatory authority in response
to such imminent public threats.
In the Fourth Amendment context, the special needs doctrine
permits the use of minimally intrusive seizures and/or searches when
necessary to deter or detect an imminent threat to public safety, so
long as the scope of such intrusions is narrowly tailored to the
threat.122 In Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme
Court extended this exception to the normal individualized suspicion
requirement of the Fourth Amendment to sobriety checkpoints.123
The Court concluded that the use of such checkpoints was motivated
by a primary protective purpose, and not to search for evidence to use
against the citizen.124 This primary purpose rationale was central to
the Court’s subsequent decision in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
where the Court rejected applicability of this exception to justify the
use of drug detection checkpoints on public roads.125
According to the Court, the key distinction between Sitz and
Edmond was that in Edmond, the police objective was
indistinguishable from the routine law enforcement objective of
searching for criminal evidence.126 In contrast, in Sitz the primary
objective was not to search for evidence, but to protect the public
from a serious danger.127 Thus, in the context of search and seizure
law, the Court has created a somewhat ironic “evidentiary use”
equation: if police conduct a suspicionless search or seizure for the
purpose of discovering evidence, it is a traditional “evidentiary”
search triggering the individualized suspicion requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. As a result, if police are successful, the evidence
they discover may not be used in court because the lack of
individualized suspicion renders the intrusion a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. However, if the primary police objective is not
to find evidence, but instead to avert an imminent and serious public

121. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
122. See generally City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2002); Mich. Dep’t
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
123. 496 U.S. at 455.
124. Id. at 420–21.
125. 531 U.S. at 44.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 39.
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danger, the individualized suspicion requirement of the Fourth
Amendment is inapplicable. As a result, any evidence they do
discover may be used in court even though they lacked individualized
suspicion.
The theory behind proposals for expanding the PSE to facilitate
police questioning of terrorist suspects for the purpose of averting an
imminent terrorist attack seems identical to the justification for the
special needs doctrine. Unlike normal custodial interrogation, this
type of questioning is not primarily intended to solve suspected crime
and obtain a confession for use against the suspect. Instead, these are
secondary byproducts of questioning motivated by a legitimate desire
to protect the public from imminent threat. This common rationale
seems to be an even more compelling justification for expanding the
PSE. The PSE is premised in part on an analogous theory: that the
desire to avert an imminent public danger mitigates the risk of the
type of calculated police tactics that necessitated the imposition of the
Miranda warning and waiver requirement.128
This element of the PSE and the special needs doctrine also reveals
what seems to be an equally significant aspect of both exceptions: the
unwillingness of the Supreme Court to subject law enforcement
personnel charged with protecting the public with a Hobson’s Choice
between ensuring evidence admissibility or protecting the public. In
cases ranging from Quarles to Sitz to Terry v. Ohio, the Court has
consistently demonstrated a willingness to balance the limits it
imposes on police investigatory methods with the pragmatic realities
of pressures confronted by law enforcement when dealing with an
imminent public danger.129 The Court’s assessment in Terry of the
limited efficacy of rules that fail to take these pressures into account130
serves as an important reminder that this Hobson’s Choice will almost
always be resolved in favor of self-protection or protection of the
public. As a result, law enforcement officers must remain cognizant
of the distinction between intrusions conducted for the purpose of
gathering evidence, and those conducted for the distinct purpose of

128. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656–58 (1984).
129. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (“[I]n view of these facts, we
cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves
and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable
cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to
deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the
person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.”).
130. Id. at 9–15.
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protecting officers or the public from imminent danger, and that an
inflexible approach to such realities ultimately undermines respect for
the law:
The exclusionary rule has its limitations, however, as a tool of
judicial control. It cannot properly be invoked to exclude the
products of legitimate police investigative techniques on the ground
that much conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted
intrusions upon constitutional protections. Moreover, in some
contexts, the rule is ineffective as a deterrent. Street encounters
between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity.
They range from wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries or
mutually useful information to hostile confrontations of armed men
involving arrests, or injuries, or loss of life. Moreover, hostile
confrontations are not all of a piece. Some of them begin in a
friendly enough manner, only to take a different turn upon the
injection of some unexpected element into the conversation.
Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of purposes,
some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for
crime. Doubtless some police “field interrogation” conduct violates
the Fourth Amendment. But a stern refusal by this Court to
condone such activity does not necessarily render it responsive to
the exclusionary rule. Regardless of how effective the rule may be
where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police,
it is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed
rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are
willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some
other goal.131

This certainly did not indicate that the Court would simply adopt
interpretations of the Fourth (and by implication the Fifth)
Amendment based solely on the interests of law enforcement. It did,
however, indicate that where police intrusions were motivated by a
genuine safety objective, the law must respond to ensure a pragmatic
balance between the interests implicated by such intrusions.
The compelling government interest associated with protecting the
public from imminent terrorist threats, coupled with the established
Supreme Court pattern of tailoring constitutional protections to
accommodate this interest, supports the logic of expanding the PSE to
cover law enforcement questioning of terrorist suspects when the
primary purpose of such questioning is preventing an imminent
terrorist attack.
Nevertheless, drawing from special needs
jurisprudence, it also suggests that any such exception must be
narrowly tailored to ensure that it is applied only to objectively
131. Id. at 13–14 (footnotes omitted).
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genuine situations of imminent terrorist threats, and that the scope of
questioning is limited to responding to such threats.
V. TAILORING A TERRORISM EXPANSION OF PUBLIC SAFETY TO
A N ARROW R ANGE OF C ASES W HERE THE C ONFESSION I S C ASE
DISPOSITIVE
Expanding the PSE to justify all custodial interrogation of terrorist
suspects cannot be reconciled with Miranda’s core concerns. Such a
blanket exception would be inconsistent with the underling rationale
of Quarles, as well as the special needs doctrine. Instead, any valid
expansion must be based on two essential pillars. First, there must be
some method of objectively assessing the legitimacy of the asserted
imminent public danger. Second, the scope of unwarned questioning
must be limited to responding to that danger.
Imposing an objective assessment of a situation is a common
practice in assessing police compliance with constitutional
requirements. In the Miranda context, for purposes of triggering the
Miranda rule, interrogation includes, according to Rhode Island v.
Innis, both express questioning, and “words or actions on the part of
the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.”132 This focus on the
“likelihood” that police conduct will elicit an incriminating response
requires courts to assess what an objective officer would have
expected; the subjective expectations of the actual officer are not
controlling. The same objective situation assessment is inherent in
the existing Quarles PSE exception: a judicial determination that the
questioning was necessary to secure the safety of the officer or public
as a predicate for exempting the questioning from the Miranda
requirement.133
This objective assessment is also inherent in applying the special
needs doctrine, as illustrated by the contrasting holdings of Sitz
(sobriety checkpoints)134 and Edmond (drug detection checkpoints).135
In both cases, the government asserted the brief traffic stops were
motivated by a concern for public safety.136 However, in Edmond, the
Court rejected that assertion, concluding that the asserted

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnote omitted).
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657–58 (1984).
See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–43 (2000).
Id. at 40–41; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449.
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justification could not override the objective indicators that the drug
stops were indistinguishable from general law enforcement stops.137
According to the Court:
Petitioners propose several ways in which the narcotics-detection
purpose of the instant checkpoint program may instead resemble the
primary purposes of the checkpoints in Sitz . . . .
Petitioners also emphasize the severe and intractable nature of
the drug problem as justification for the checkpoint program. There
is no doubt that traffic in illegal narcotics creates social harms of the
first magnitude . . . . But the gravity of the threat alone cannot be
dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement
officers may employ to pursue a given purpose. Rather, in
determining whether individualized suspicion is required, we must
consider the nature of the interests threatened and their connection
to the particular law enforcement practices at issue. We are
particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to the general rule of
individualized suspicion where governmental authorities primarily
pursue their general crime control ends.138

Similar objective “gate keeping” assessments must be built into any
expansion of the PSE. Courts must be empowered to assess the
objective validity of an asserted imminent terrorist threat. They
should only allow use of statements obtained pursuant to the
exception when it is established by the government that a reasonable
officer would have expected that a failure to immediately question a
suspect without first obtaining a Miranda waiver would subject the
public to imminent danger of death, great bodily harm, or serious
property damage. As with other reasonableness assessments, the
officer should not be required to be accurate. Instead, so long as the
judgment of imminent threat was reasonable, the exception should be
validated. However, relying exclusively on the interrogating officer’s
subjective perceptions should be regarded as insufficient. Only when
those perceptions can be objectively validated should the exception
apply.
Limiting the scope of questioning justified by the PSE should pose
little difficulty for a reviewing court. Only statements made in
response to questions related to discovering and preventing the
anticipated threat of an imminent terrorist attack would be
admissible. All other statements would fall outside the scope of the
exception and be subject to the traditional Miranda warning and
waiver requirement.
137. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.
138. Id. at 42–43 (citations omitted).
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VI. HOW EXPANDING THE QUARLES EXCEPTION IS A NET GAIN
FOR T ERROR S USPECTS : I NCENTIVIZING THE A RTICLE III
PROSECUTION OPTION
Any expansion of the PSE should justifiably trigger concern that
the Miranda decision’s core protections would be diluted. The Court
in Quarles chose almost thirty years ago to endorse a rule that
balanced the authority to engage in custodial interrogation with the
need to protect the public from imminent danger. In the context of
terrorism investigations, this justification seems almost more
compelling than in the Quarles context. Unlike the officer who
confronted Quarles, law enforcement agents questioning a terrorist
suspect will often be under immense pressure to respond to a threat
that can produce much more widespread harm to the public. Like
Quarles, however, the nature of coordinated terrorist operations
indicates that it will often be the case that information from the
suspect may be the only viable means for averting this type of serious
and widespread harm. One need only consider the case of Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab, where federal agents sought to establish
whether other trans-Atlantic flights en route or about to depart from
Europe were at risk of explosion.139 Had this been the case,
information from Abdulmutallab may have been the only way to
avert catastrophic loss.
This is not the only consideration that compels adopting a terroristspecific expansion of the PSE. As noted previously, whatever
dilution of a suspect’s protection from custodial interrogation that
results from such an expansion will be offset by the decreased
likelihood that the suspect will be transferred to military custody for
prosecution by military commission.140 The availability of this
alternate option for dealing with the terrorist suspect fundamentally
alters the Hobson’s Choice equation. Unlike the officer who
confronted Quarles, federal agents who today confront a terror
suspect may not perceive a choice between protecting the public or an
ability to prosecute.141 Instead, if the PSE is unavailable in such
situations, the choice to question in violation of Miranda will not
necessarily foreclose subsequent use of the statement to prosecute the
suspect. But instead of prosecution in an Article III court, the suspect

139. United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 10-20005, 2011 WL 4345243, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 16, 2011).
140. See supra Part III.
141. See supra Part III.
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may find himself transferred to military custody for prosecution
before a military commission.142
The availability of the alternate “terrorist suspect” response option
of military detention must ultimately tip the balance in favor of
expanding the PSE to address the threat of international terrorism.
Consistent with the President’s stated objective of minimizing
reliance on military custody and trial by military commission,143 any
rule that renders such disposition of a terror suspect more likely
should be reconsidered. That is precisely the effect of a narrow
application of the PSE. Only by facilitating narrowly tailored
questioning of international terror suspects in response to an
imminent threat of terrorist attack will the likelihood of invoking this
third rail option be diminished. Thus, it is the terror suspect himself
that may actually be the primary beneficiary of an expanded PSE.
CONCLUSION
In Quarles, the Supreme Court eliminated the Hobson’s choice
between ensuring public safety and ensuring admissibility of a
suspect’s statement when responding to a situation where safety
necessitated immediate questioning of a suspect taken into custody.144
The Court held that a legitimate public safety concern justified an
exception to the normal Miranda warning and waiver prerequisite for
admissibility of such statements, but did not define the scope of the
exception.145 While an objectively credible concern for public safety
was an essential element of the exception, it remained unclear
whether only the type of spontaneous questioning that occurred in
Quarles fell within the exception, or whether it extended to longerterm and more calculated questioning.
This uncertainty was starkly exposed when the government
invoked the PSE to justify extended questioning of Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab after he was taken into custody following his failed
attempt to destroy a trans-Atlantic commercial airliner. Applying the
Quarles PSE to extended questioning of terror suspects should trigger
criticism that this extension exceeds the scope of the PSE. Extended
questioning is anything but spontaneous, and therefore extending the

142. See supra Part III.
143. See Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks at the National
Defense University (May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/
05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university (renewing the President’s stated
desire to close the military detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba).
144. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
145. See id. at 679–80 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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exception to such situations unjustifiably dilutes Miranda protections
for these suspects.
Critics of expanding the PSE fail to adequately consider the impact
of the military incapacitation option for suspected terrorist
operatives. This option has altered the balance of interests central to
a narrow application of the PSE. Restricting the scope of the PSE to
questioning (such as that in Quarles) will not necessarily accrue to
suspects’ benefit the way it did before the “War on Terror”. Instead,
such a restriction may compel the government to avoid the civilian
criminal prosecution option altogether, and avoid all Miranda-related
concerns by invoking the military incapacitation option.
The aftermath of a terrorist attack is chaotic and emotionally
charged, and is exactly when clear rules for questioning suspects—and
sanctions for over reaching—are needed most. The possibility of
military detention—whether on a U.S. Navy warship or while in a
Boston hospital bed—undermines the risk associated with a narrow
application of the PSE. In the normal criminal investigation, a
narrow application of the PSE would not tolerate long-term
questioning of a suspect. Instead, police would have to choose
between questioning without complying with Miranda and forfeiting
the ability to use a suspect’s statements, or complying with Miranda
and losing potentially invaluable information. However, when the
suspect is an individual who may be designated an enemy combatant
and subjected to military detention and trial by commission, the
choice is no longer binary. Instead, the government may invoke a
third option: conduct long-duration questioning without complying
with Miranda, obtain the information deemed necessary, and then
incapacitate the suspect by designating him an enemy belligerent. As
a result, an expanded application of the PSE may actually be in the
suspect’s best interest because it will incentivize reliance on the
civilian criminal process.
The risk that the military incapacitation option may gain
momentum in response to a future terrorist threat is not hypothetical.
Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine an aggressive use of this option in
response to another major terrorist attack on the nation. It is
therefore essential to consider this possibility when assessing the
relative risks and rewards associated with the scope of the PSE.
Doing so in the calm light of day—before the next incident increases
the calls for military detention of terrorism suspects—will facilitate a
credible balance between the interests that lie at the core of the
exception. Ultimately, expanding the scope of the PSE in certain
counterterrorism investigations will incentivize normal law
enforcement disposition. Expanding the PSE exception will also
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inure to the terrorism suspect’s benefit by increasing the probability
that his case will be adjudicated in an Article III court, mitigating the
risk of indefinite military detention.

